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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
should adopt a rule similar to that proposed by the American Law
Institute which would require a "rational basis" '2 5 to appear in
the evidence in support of any verdict upon which the jury is to
be instructed.
J. C. Parkerson
DONATIONS MORTIS CAUSA - REQUIREMENT OF "ABILITY TO
READ" UNDER NEW WILLS ACT
Decedent's niece petitioned for the probate of her aunt's last
will and testament which had been confected under the provisions
of the new wills act.' Other collateral relatives of decedent op-
posed probate of the will, contending that the decedent was un-
able to read at the time the will was confected as required by the
statute.2  The proponents offered the testimony of eight wit-
nesses in their attempt to prove that the testatrix was able to
read.3 The lower court held the will to be null because the pro-
25. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(5), Tentative Draft No. 5 (1956). "The
court shall not charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is
a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense." Id. at 30. The comment which follows
this section states that: "Subsection (5) states that the court shall instruct the
jury with respect to included offenses only in cases where the evidence makes it
appropriate to do so. Where the proof goes to the higher inclusive offense and
would not justify any other verdict except a conviction of that offense or an
acquittal, it would be improper to instruct the jury with respect to included of-
fenses. Instructions with respect to included offenses in such cases might well be
an invitation to the jury to return a compromise or otherwise unwarranted verdict."
Id. at 42.
1. La. Acts 1952, No. 66, incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:2442-2444 (Supp. 1958).
2. Four witnesses were called by the opponents. Two of these witnesses, who
had been rather close associates of the decedent, testified that they had assisted
her in such things as making change, reading menus, paying bills, and making
telephone calls. These witnesses were unrelated to any of the parties and were
apparently completely disinterested.
The other two witnesses were related to the testatrix and would have shared
in her estate had she been held to have died intestate. One of these witnesses un-
equivocally stated that he knew that the decedent could not read.
3. Three of these witnesses were related to the deceased and were named lega-
tees under the will. Their testimony consisted generally of their observations of
the testatrix reading the paper.
The attorney before whom the will was executed and who was appearing for
the proponents in the case also testified. He stated that he had left a draft of
an olographic will with the decedent the day before the confection of the statutory
instrument for her to copy. The draft had been in "large lettering." This witness
further testified that he had asked the decedent whether she could read and had
received an affirmative answer.
A sister of one of the legatees under the statutory will testified that she had
seen the decedent copying from the draft of the olographic will left with her by
the attorney.
One of the witnesses to the confection of the will stated that the attorney had
read the will aloud and that the testatrix was also reading it aloud at the time.
This witness was a client of the attorney before whom the will was executed.
The wife of the attorney was another witness to the confection of the will and
ponents had failed to carry the burden of proving that the de-
cedent could read at the time the will was confected. On appeal,
held, reversed. A decision as to which party had the burden of
proving the ability of the testatrix to read is unnecessary since
the proponents have assumed and sustained that burden. Suc-
cession of Thibodeaux, 116 So.2d 525 (La. 1959).
Under the Louisiana Civil Code testaments disposing of prop-
erty mortis causa may take any of four forms, i.e., nuncupative
by public act,4 nuncupative under private signature,5 mystic,6 and
olographic.7 A few illustrations of some of the formalities re-
quired in the confection of these testaments will make clearer the
simplicity which characterizes the new wills act. The nuncupa-
tive will by public act must be dictated to a notary and read back
to the testator in the presence of three witnesses residing in the
place8 where the will is executed, or five witnesses not so resid-
ingY This procedure must be completed without interruption.10
The nuncupative will under private signature may be written by
the testator or dictated to another in the presence of five wit-
nesses residing in the place where the will is executed or seven
witnesses not so residing." This type of will may also be con-
fected by the testator's presentation of the instrument which has
previously been written to the same number of witnesses, accom-
panied by a declaration that it is his last will.' 2 In either case the
nuncupative will under private signature must be read in the
presence of the testator and the witnesses by the testator or one
of the witnesses.' s The mystic will is confected by the testator's
testified that the decedent read the will along with the attorney or followed him
as he read. She further stated that the decedent signed the will in the presence of
the attorney and both witnesses.
A handwriting expert advanced his opinion that the body of the olographic
will which was purportedly copied from the draft left with the decedent by the
attorney had been copied by the decedent.
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1578 (1870).
5. Id. art. 1581.
6. Id. art. 1584.
7. Id. art. 1588.
8. Id. art. 1594 explains "in the place" to mean the parish where the will is
confected.
9. Id. art. 1578.
10. Ibid. Under Article 1579 the testator must sign the instrument unless he
does not know how or is not able; in which case express mention of his failure to
sign and the reasons therefor must be contained in the testament. Under Article
1580 the will must be signed by all the witnesses if all can write, or at least by
one of them for all if the others cannot write.
11. Id. art. 1581. Under the provisions of Article 1588, if the will is confected
in the country, three witnesses residing in the place, or five without will suffice,
if more witnesses cannot be obtained.
12. Id. art. 1581.
13. Id. art. 1582. This instrument must be signed by the testator if he knows
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presentation of the instrument to a notary and three witnesses.
To preserve secrecy the instrument may be sealed prior to pres-
entation or in the presence of the notary and witnesses. 14 This
form of testament may not be used by those who cannot write
and those who cannot sign their names. 15 The only formal re-
quirements of an olographic will are that it be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator. 6
In 1952 the Louisiana Legislature adopted the new wills act.17
Apparently, the purpose of this legislation was to provide a
method of disposing of property mortis causa without many of
the -technicalities connected with those methods provided by the
Civil Code. Under this act the will may be written in any man-
ner 8 and must be signed by the testator in the presence of a
notary and two witnesses. The testator must sign each page of
the will and the notary and witnesses must also sign at the end
of the will below an attestation stating that the formal require-
ments have been met. 19 Another requirement of the statute is
that the testator must have the ability to read.20 It can readily
be seen that the formal requirements of the new wills act are
much less demanding than those forms provided for in the Civil
Code, with the possible exception of the olographic form. Three
reported cases in addition to the instant case have been decided
under the new wills act. In Succession of Pope,2' the will was
held invalid because of a violation of the requirement that the
notary, witnesses, and testator sign the instrument in the pres-
ence of each other.2 2 Succession of Eck23 involved a will with a
how or is able, and by at least two of the witnesses if the others do not know how.
Those who do not know how to sign must affix their mark.
14. Id. art. 1584.
15. Id. art. 1586.
16. Id. art. 1588.
17. La. Acts 1952, No. 66, incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:2442-2444 (Supp. 1958).
18. "[A] will shallij5e valid if in writing (whether typewritten, printed, mimeo-
graphed, or written in any other manner)." La. Acts 1952, No. 66, § 1, incor-
porated as LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1958).
19. "The foregoing facts shall be evidenced in writing above the signatures of
the notary public and witnesses and the testator at the end of the will. Such dec-
laration may be in the following form or a form substantially similar thereto:
(a) Signed (on each page) and declared by testator above named, in our presence
to be his last will and testament, and in the presence of the testator and each
other we have hereunto subscribed our names on this ........ day of ............ 19 .....
La. Acts 1952, No. 66, § 1, incorporated as LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1958).
20. Id. 9:2443. It is interesting to note that the act, when presented to the
legislature, contained the requirement that "those who know not how or are not
able to read, and those who know not how or are not able to sign their names, can-
not make dispositions in the form of the will herein provided for." The require-
ment as to the ability of the testator to write was deleted before passage of the
act. See Comment, 28 TUL. L. REv. 288, 289 (1954).
21. 230 La. 1049, 89 So.2d 894 (1956).
22. "In the presence of the notary and both witnesses the testator . .. shall
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double attestation clause with the signature of the testator after
the first and the signature of the notary and witnesses after the
second of the clauses. The opponents of the will argued that the
statutory requirement that the attestation clause be above the
signature of the notary, witnesses, and testator at the end of the
will had been violated.2 4 Noting that the purpose of the require-
ment that the will be signed at the end was to prevent fraudulent
additions thereto, the court determined that the end of the will
meant that place where the dispositive provisions ended and
therefore did not include the second of the attestation clauses be-
low which only the signature of the notary and witnesses ap-
peared.25 The court further pointed out that the requirement
that the testator, notary, and witnesses sign below the attesta-
tion clause had been met since the testator had signed below the
first such clause and the notary and witnesses below the second.
The Eck decision also stands for the proposition that the com-
petency of witnesses to a will under the new wills act is to be
determined by the provisions on that subject in the Civil Code.
In Succession of Nourse26 the testator's signature appeared only
once on each page of the instrument. The validity of the will was
attacked on the theory that the statute required the testator to
sign on each separate sheet of the instrument and also sign the
attestation clause at the end of the will.2 7 In disposing of this
argument the court held that the signature of the testator ful-
filled the formal requirements of the statute.
The court in the instant case was faced with the problem of
applying the statutory requirement that the testator have the
ability to read in order to confect a will under the new wills act.
The lower court had found that the proponents had not sustained
the burden of proving that the testatrix could read at the time
the will was confected. Although the Supreme Court declined the
opportunity to decide which party had the burden of proof under
the circumstances, it reversed the lower court's decision, finding
sign each separate sheet of the instrument. The notary and both witnesses must
sign at the end of the will (a) In the presence of the testator, and (b) In the
presence of each other." La. Acts 1952, No. 66, § 1, incorporated as LA. R.S.
9:2442 (Supp. 1958).
23. 233 La. 764, 98 So.2d 181 (1957).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See Note, 32 TUL. L. REv. 521 (1958).
26. 234 La. 691, 101 So.2d 204 (1958).
27. See note 19 supra.
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that the proponents of the will had assumed and carried the bur-
den of proving the ability of the testatrix to read. Under the evi-
dence adduced upon the trial of the case it appears that the court
might well have affirmed the lower court's decision that the
testatrix did not have the ability to read at the time the will was
confected.2 1 In view of the fact that the Supreme Court will
usually accept a lower court's findings on questions of fact where
the credibility of witnesses is involved,29 the instant decision may
be indicative of a liberal attitude toward the statutory require-
ment that a testator have the ability to read in order to make use
of the new wills act.
Since the comparatively few formal requirements imposed by
the new wills act are devised to prevent fraudulent practices, it
appears that they should be rigidly enforced. However, when
there is no indication of fraud, such as in the instant case, it is
felt that the court may properly take a more liberal attitude as
to the weight of conflicting evidence in construing the formal
requirements of a testament.
Hugh T. Ward
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ABSTENTION
APPLIED TO CIVIL RIGHTS CASE
Declaratory and injunctive relief were sought in a three-judge
federal district court' convened to hear constitutional challenges
to five Virginia segregation laws.2  Federal jurisdiction was
28. See notes 2 and 3 8upra.
29. See, e.g., Orlando v. Polito, 228 La. 846, 84 So.2d 433 (1955).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952) provides that the following factors will necessitate
the convening of a three-judge court: (1) injunctive relief must be requested;
(2) plaintiff must ask that state officers be restrained from enforcing a state
statute or an order of a state administrative agency; (3) the contention must be
made that the statute or order violates the Federal Constitution. The fact that a
three-judge court always sits as a court of equity has enabled the doctrines of
equitable discretions to enter the picture. See MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE
JUDICIAL CODE 51-54 (1949) ; Comment, 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 813 (1959).
2. 4 VA. CODE §§ 18-349.9-18-349.37 (Supp. 1958); 7 VA. CODE §§ 54-74,
54-78, 54-79 (1958).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1952) : "Civil Rights and Elective Franchise
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person;
"(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of
the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United Staes, by any
act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42;
"(2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in
preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowl-
edge were about to occur and power to prevent;
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